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ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY Semester IV
Course Code: BAI405D
CIE Marks: 50
Teaching Hours/Week (L:T:P: S): 2:2:0:0
SEE Marks: 50
Total Hours of Pedagogy: 40
Total Marks: 100
Credits: 03
Exam Hours: 03
Examination type (SEE): Theory

Introduction to Strategic Games: What is game theory? The theory of rational choice, Strategic games; Examples: The prisoner’s dilemma, Bach or Stravinsky, Matching pennies; Nash equilibrium; Examples of Nash equilibrium; Best response functions; Dominated actions.

(8 hours)

(RBT Levels: L1, L2 and L3)

Teaching-Learning Process: Chalk and talk method / PowerPoint Presentation

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Introduction; Strategic games in which players may randomize; Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium; Dominated actions; Pure equilibrium when randomization is allowed. Illustration: Expert Diagnosis; Equilibrium in a single population.

(8 hours)

(RBT Levels: L1, L2 and L3)

Teaching-Learning Process: Chalk and talk method / PowerPoint Presentation

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Extensive games with perfect information; Strategies and outcomes; Nash equilibrium; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Finding sub-game perfect equilibria of finite horizon games: Backward induction; Illustrations: The ultimatum game, Stackelberg’s model of duopoly.

(8 hours)

(RBT Levels: L1, L2 and L3)

Teaching-Learning Process: Chalk and talk method / PowerPoint Presentation

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Bayesian Games, Motivational examples; General definitions; Two examples concerning information; Illustrations: Cournot’s duopoly game with imperfect information, Providing a public good; Auctions: Auctions with an arbitrary distribution of valuations.

(8 hours)

(RBT Levels: L1, L2 and L3)

Teaching-Learning Process: Chalk and talk method / PowerPoint Presentation

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Competative Games: Strictly competitive games and maximization.

Repeated games: The main idea; Preferences; Repeated games; Finitely and infinitely repeated Prisoner’s dilemma; Strategies in an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s dilemma; Nash equilibrium of an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s dilemma, Nash equilibrium payoffs of an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s dilemma.

(8 hours)

(RBT Levels: L1, L2 and L3)

Teaching-Learning Process: Chalk and talk method / PowerPoint Presentation

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2022 SCHEME QUESTION PAPER

Model Set 1 Paper

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Model Set 1 Paper Solution

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Model Set 2 Paper

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Model Set 2 Paper Solution

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Regular Paper

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Back Paper

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